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Abstract 
The present study attempts to answer who 
benefits by looking at the geographic distribution 
of special GRS from FY1998 to FY2000 in 
Taoyuan based on distributive theories. The multi-
level analysis is applied to this study, because we 
speculate that the distribution of special GRS is 
influenced by the political factors of lower 
jurisdictional levels, and of the upper 
jurisdictional levels in county as well.  According 
to the multi-level analysis, we find that the factors 
affecting the distribution of special GRS to the 
lower jurisdictional levels (villiage-level) are 
mainly from the same level, not from the upper 
jurisdictional levels in county (town-level).  
Looking at the village-level analysis alone, the 
factors of voting gains of the county legislators 
and town legislators affect the distribution of 
special GRS. Even so, the explained variance is 
still limited meaning that there are certain 
variables of village-level need to be explored.  On 
the other hand, for the town-level analysis alone, 
 2
we find that the towns are controlled by DPP,  
with senior county legislators, or have less 
population receive disproportionate special GRS. 
The explained variances reach 48.5%.  In sum, 
when county-in-chief decides the location of the 
distribution of special GRS, town-level will be the 
crucial condiseration. 
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